

**ACTIONAID INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES**

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**TYPHOON YOLANDA  
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE  
REAL TIME EVALUATION+**

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**March 2014**



**Submitted by:**

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## **Acknowledgment**

Thank you to all in the community, partners and staff and others who have provided time and information towards this report.

# 1. Executive Summary

*“Everyone deserves not just to survive,  
but to live...”  
- 12 Years A Slave*



## Introduction

All evaluations are a mirror of an event, or a snapshot of an ongoing process. Evaluations are also often abstractions of complex processes and dynamics. There will be other interpretations or narratives describing this emergency response programme from different organizations and individuals; from different viewpoints and perspectives. Therefore, we enjoin readers of this document to engage with the ideas presented here in the spirit of learning, appreciation, challenge and ultimately improved practice.

ActionAid International (AAI) decided on the same day that Typhoon Yolanda hit the Philippines to mount a humanitarian response programme. This mandate translated into the mobilization of agreed internal protocols within AAI, the deployment of a mission team, the undertaking of a rapid needs assessment, fundraising from both public and institutional sources, engagement with potential partners. In keeping with AAI core approach, the response was intended to be a partnership-based response. AAI also deployed personnel from its IHART (International Humanitarian Action and Resilience Team) and EFAST (Emergency Fast Action and Support Team) to support national partners. It was also clear from the beginning that the response will include short-term and long-term components, based on the core principles of rights-based approach to humanitarian action, centrality of women’s rights, and participatory development at community level.

## Main Findings

The main findings of the RTE are organized around the four agreed dimensions, i.e.,

- **Efficiency.** Compared with other actors, both government and non-government, the emergency response mounted by the partners were, for the most part relatively late, (late-January and early February), with a few distributions occurring in November 2013. This was due mainly to the fact that agreements and resource transfers happened mostly in mid-to-late December, typhoons that hit Samar and Leyte in January, and other operational complexities. The distributions that happened in November and early December were the results of AAI agreeing with Caritas-Switzerland, Balay Mindanaw and Rural Missionaries of the Philippines to use and/or build on the partners' available resources to avoid duplication and maximize the reach of their operations.
- **Effectiveness.** Based on benchmarking from comparator agencies on both quantity of resources and mode of distribution, the partners' operations can be rated as somewhere in the middle of a scale. Most of the partner food and non-food distribution were small in quantity and one-off operations. Their mode of operation, however is greatly admired, especially the fact that partners invested in community consultation, organization and capacity building. There were new insights among the partners regarding the need to address the needs of special groups, e.g., women, elderly, lactating mothers, children and persons with disability.
- **Accountability.** The partners, due to strong push from AAI, are relatively ahead of other national humanitarian actors in the matter of formal accountability mechanisms (transparency board, suggestion boxes, hotlines). Their strength is in the substantive dimension of accountability expressed in their emphasis on community participation in key operational events (needs assessment, distribution, etc.) and setting up of community mechanisms such as grievance and oversight committees, canvas and procurement committees, etc.
- **Connectedness.** Partners' engagement with cluster activities is uneven, especially because they are new to this dimension of humanitarian work. However, those moments when they were able to attend cluster meetings were eye-openers. Partner participation in these platforms was a key advocacy by AAI. Also, from the very start AAI and partners were also looking at a more long-term perspective in their Yolanda response. Connection is important in a fluid and complex situation such as the one obtaining in the aftermath of Yolanda – humanitarian organizations need to have a capacity to be adaptive and make changes in their plans/operations as new realities emerge or when things are better understood. In fact, a number of AAI partners have made adjustments to their plans, ranging from a partner deciding against emergency relief distribution, to other partners redesigning their response plans and reallocating resources, and still other partners focusing on influencing other actors decisions and actions. These adaptive adjustments are important learning points in humanitarian response operations.

By end February, AAI estimates that the whole operation has reached approximately 70,000 individuals. This is a significant number of recipients and represents 70% of the original target of 100,000 individuals (20,000 families) for Phase 1 of the response.

## Partnerships

A major explanatory factor for the preceding assessment is the nature of partners and the partnership forged between them and AAI. All of the partners have no core competence or specialization in humanitarian work and therefore were not familiar with basic humanitarian standards and accountability principles and measures. They were also new in the actual programme areas they decided to serve. Therefore, for most of them, it was a learning experience, supported positively AAI staff. Partners appreciate AAI's flexibility, openness and strong commitment to the three core principles. AAI recognize the partners' track record in participatory long-term development and their willingness to learn.

There are a number of partnership issues that need to be addressed moving forward. These include:

- Continuing discussions and debate to ensure solid shared understanding of the concept and operationalization of rights-based development, women's rights and participatory development
- Continuing support towards partner understanding of humanitarian standards and principles and accountability mechanisms
- Better planned and spaced non-funding support and accompaniment
- More realistic narrative and financial reporting requirements
- Promotion of better coordination with partners' other donors, where relevant

## Issues and Recommendations


Moving forward, the general post-Yolanda emergency and post-emergency response remains complicated, uncertain and under-resourced. Significant sectors are underfunded and pledged donations are not coming through. The government's own recovery framework and mechanisms remain ambiguous.

- **Immediate Concerns.** Partners and AAI need to focus on fast-tracking food security and vulnerable livelihoods and shelter efforts. It is imperative that the partners get a handle on the food and income gaps of partners in the coming three to six months and craft fast-track strategies to address them immediately but also linked with long-term strategies. It is clear that there will be no additional resources for this phase so that partners need to be creative in terms of leveraging their resources and influencing other actors with available resources.
- **Long-Term Concerns.** As the partners and AAI move into planning the post-emergency response phase, they should consider the following:
  - Building capacity within partners and communities to develop adaptive management competencies to deal with the new "normal" or novel and unfamiliar shocks. Disaster preparedness, risk reduction and adaptation should be embedded in long-term development thinking and programming.
  - Building new competencies among partners towards world-class humanitarianism that supports community-based frontline responders and manages external, including, international actors. AAI can support linking

partners with other national organisations involved in Yolanda response in learning and networking event.

- Ensuring that long-term development plans are inclusive and promotive of people's right to development and participation in democratic political processes and governance, planning and budgeting. Ensure a robust power analysis in development planning.
- Ensuring that post-emergency plans address pre-existing causes and drivers of poverty and vulnerability, have clear levels of analysis and planning (coherence between barangay and municipality planning), more focused geographic spread, coherent planning framework, and prioritizes allocation of scarce resources to the rehabilitation requirement of poor and vulnerable populations

## 2. Background



### 2.1. Typhoon Yolanda and AAI

On 8<sup>th</sup> November 2013, Typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) hit the Philippines, causing massive damage and affecting more than 14 million people, causing the death of at least 6,000 people and damage to crops and properties estimated at GBP 7.8 billion. The unprecedented intensity and scale of damage wrought by the typhoon has resulted in a massive international emergency response effort, involving a large number of government, corporate, non-government and multilateral agencies, including non-traditional and largely spontaneous responses. Aside from the usual problems of humanitarian coordination, logistical logjams, and government inaction,<sup>1</sup> accountability and corruption and was a major concern for any humanitarian actors and donors, both national and international. Some groups advised donors to course funding directly to the Red Cross instead of the national government citing the desire to have “every cent to reach those poor people there rather than getting waylaid.”<sup>2</sup> In fact, a significant number of national and international groups organized their own delivery mechanisms straight into individual villages rather than going through non-government or government intermediary channels.

<sup>1</sup> There was no significant relief, rescue and clearing operations mounted by government five days

<sup>2</sup> Associated Press “Corruption Magnifies Effects of Typhoon Yolanda.”

<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/529795/corruption-magnifies-effects-of-typhoon-yolanda>

This was the situation that met the ActionAid International three-person team that arrived in the country on 13<sup>th</sup> November. The team undertook a rapid needs assessment that formed the basis for its Typhoon Yolanda Response Programme Framework. AAI has not worked in the Philippines previously and therefore decided that the response will be implemented through local partners. The team got in touch with local organizations, referred by staff members and contacts in other agencies, for possible partnerships in implementing the emergency response programme. In the end, AAI entered into partnerships with 7 organizations (one international and six national) to undertake a humanitarian response with two phases: the emergency response phase from December 2013 to April 2014 and the long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction phase for at least two years thereafter.

The partnerships were forged mainly around three areas of agreement: human rights-based perspective on development and humanitarian action, women's rights and gender justice, and participatory development.

By February 2014, humanitarian operations of most agencies have either stabilized or come to a stop, especially the distribution of emergency food, non-food items and temporary shelter materials. A number of organizations have already started their early recovery and food security programmes. There are still significant food and shelter needs. However, the long-term challenge of economic development in the main areas affected by Yolanda, particularly eastern Visayas, looms large. These areas constitute the poorest parts of the Philippines, mainly dependent on coconut, fishing and an infant tourism industry. Some sectors believe that since the affected areas are the country's least developed, the impact on macro-economic growth may not be significant. However, this is where the challenge lies – despite all the hustle and bustle in the emergency period, there is a strong likelihood that the region may be forgotten again.

## 2.2. AAI Response Framework

On the same day that Yolanda struck, the AAI Chief Executive and the Senior Leadership Team took a decision to respond to the emergency. This was presented to the Board for approval, especially since this involved operating in a new country. The response closely followed AAI's humanitarian response protocols that included mobilization of its IHART and EFAST mechanisms, mounting a fundraising effort, and undertaking a necessary needs assessment. These mechanisms made it possible for AAI to send a mission team to the Philippines within a week from when the typhoon struck.

By the beginning of December, AAI's response programme framework was in place, based on a second round of assessment as well as partner assessments and proposals. AAI mounted the programme called: ***Immediate Relief and Early Recovery for Communities Affected by Typhoon Haiyan***. The goal was that by April 2014, the most vulnerable people (of which at least 65% will be women) in communities affected by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines will have secured their rights to basic needs and are supported in their early livelihood recovery through community-led actions that strengthen their capacities and resilience. The programme intended to reach 200,000 individual women, men and children.



AAI raised a total of GBP 3.7 million (PHP 280 million)<sup>3</sup> out of its fundraising target of GBP 5.0 million. Of this amount, AAI allocated GBP 1.4 million (PHP 110 million, or 38% for the emergency relief and early recovery phase that will run from December 2013 to April 2014.

The components and outcomes of the programme were identified to be:

OUTCOMES	TIMELINE	
	3 mos	6 mos
Improved psychosocial wellbeing/coping mechanisms		X
Secure access to immediate food by end-January 2014	X	
Safe and appropriate shelter by end-January 2014	X	
Essential items to allow lives with dignity by end-Feb 2014	X	
Sufficient livelihoods recovery		X

Finally, it is interesting to note that the final needs assessment undertaken by AAI in the first half of December identified the following four broad gaps:

- temporary shelter, including provision of cash to women
- food relief until families are able to get their food from their own farms and/or livelihoods
- cash for work to address cash shortage
- community involvement in planning or decision-making processes

## 2.3. Real-Time Evaluation

### 2.3.1. Purpose of the Evaluation


The overall purpose of the evaluation was to assess whether AAI's initial response to-date has served the intended purpose agreed in the Emergency Response Programme Framework while considering the key variables of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and connectedness. It was also expected to map the aspects of the response (both internal and external to AAI Philippines) that went well and which areas require improvement based on major programmatic, funding and organizational learning considerations.

### 2.3.4. Framework of the Evaluation

As indicated in the diagram below, the inquiry focused on ascertaining AAI and partners performance vis-à-vis the four key dimensions. These dimensions were further interrogated via a number of explanatory factors, both internal and external.

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<sup>3</sup> Of the total, GBP 2.85 million was sourced from the DEC appeal while GBP .90 million was raised from AAI DPRF appeal mechanism. This amount is considerable by any measure and places AAI at par with comparator international organizations that are rights-based in their approach. It should be noted, though, that other international organisations have raised amounts from six to ten times bigger than this.



### 2.3.5. Methodology and Timeline

The RTE was employed secondary data analysis, key informant interviews (recipients, partner field staff and head office personnel, AAI staff and external parties) and focus group discussions using semi-structured interviews and participatory tools. The RTE team interviewed all key partner personnel, a total of 75 individuals in 10 barangays in 5 provinces and 120 participants in focus group discussions (60% are women). The RTE covered at least two barangays in each programme province (except Iloilo), involving all partners (except Caritas Switzerland). The sample represented about 10% of programme areas.

The actual RTE was undertaken from 17th February until 2<sup>nd</sup> March. Preliminary findings were shared with partners and AAI staff in their strategic planning workshop on 4<sup>th</sup> March. Feedback from the workshop is incorporated in this report where appropriate.

The exercise recognized the importance of feedback not only to partners and AAI staff but to the community as well. Because of limitations in time, the field work included, as a standard step, an “instant feedback” to the community at the end of the visit to each barangay. The feedback consisted of a summary of key information and lessons gained during the research. The team also asked the partners to feed back to their respective communities relevant aspects of the final report.

### 2.3.6. Limitations

The main limitation of the inquiry was time – which meant that arrangements with staff, communities and other informants were made under extreme time pressure, which resulted in some inconveniences and dropped interviews. While partner staff and in some cases AAI staff went with the RTE team in the fieldwork, there were limitations regarding a more substantive part for them in the inquiry and more could have been done.

Some of the communities (and partners) we visited were also dealing with a number of other activities occurring at the same time as the RTE, both those organized by AAI and other agencies. During the two weeks of the RTE, partners also had to participate in the accountability work and host a Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) review team. In one community we visited, three meetings were happening at the same time (one organized by another INGO, another by a government agency, and the AAI RTE) so that community members had to shuttle between the three.

### **2.3.7. RTE Team**

Exchange constituted a local team for this exercise, which facilitated the research process, especially the field work. The team members who undertook the barangay interviews spoke the local language. The members of the RTE team are: Roger Ricafort (team leader), Lot Felizco and Titos Escueta (on policy and organisational dimensions), and Buenafe Dongoyan and Rochet Gonzaga (field research).

## 3. Observations and Findings

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### 3.1. Estimated Reach

By the time the RTE was undertaken, the implementation of the AAI Yolanda response framework was already in the third month of its emergency relief phase, with seven partners covering 82 barangays (basic political unit in the Philippines) in 6 provinces. According to AAI estimate, based on quantitative reporting from partners, the response has reached an estimated 70,000 individual women, men and children or about 70% of the original target reach of 100,000 for Phase 1.

### 3.2. The Critical Dimensions

#### 3.2.1. Efficiency

##### *Observations*


The efficiency dimension refers to the timeliness of the delivery of the emergency relief resources to the identified priority groups or population. Based on partner monthly reports to AAI and barangay interviews, most of the food and non-food items distribution was done between the second half of January and the first half of February 2014.

Diagram 1 below is a composite of different examples and illustrates the timing of AAI partner deliveries relative to a large number of other actors that included government (local and national agencies), international humanitarian groups, national NGOs and other private donors. The three instances when partners were able to deliver within November were those of Caritas-Switzerland, Balay Mindanaw and Rural Missionaries of the Philippines (RMP). In the case of the first two partners, they were already undertaking relief deliveries when they started their engagement with AAI. Those deliveries were funded by other sources (own funds in the case of Caritas and funds from Johanniter, a German donor, in the case of Balay Mindanaw). AAI Philippines extended a cash advance of PHP 700,000 to the Rural Missionaries of the Philippines that enabled the latter to distribute relief items earlier.

While both Caritas-Switzerland and Balay Mindanaw would have undertaken the early deliveries anyway without AAI resources, the in-principle agreement achieved at that time between AAI and these partners provided the confidence for these partners to expand their area coverage. Additionally, in the case of Caritas-Switzerland, the agreement has been to jointly fund a number of partners undertaking relief work in Bantayan Island.<sup>4</sup>


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<sup>4</sup> A number of these jointly-funded organisations later had their own direct agreements with AAI.



**Diagram 1: AAI Partners food and non-food items distribution compared to other actors.**

Next to the food and non-food items, the other significant component of the emergency relief resources distributed by the partners was shelter repair kits (SRK). However, as with the food and non-food items these were largely distributed towards the end of January and early February. Some partners still had to distribute SRKs at the time of the evaluation.



**Diagram 2: AAI Partners shelter rehabilitation materials distribution compared to other actors.**

With regards to the other sectors:

- As of end-February 2014, there was no significant distribution of early livelihoods recovery resources except for 29 sets of fishing gear distributed by RMP and 6 sets of fishing equipment (to be owned collectively) distributed by WedPro, both in February.
- Only three partners reported cash-for-work initiatives, one in December, one in January and another in February. For many partners, this was a novel idea and in at least one case, they ventured into unconditional cash grants in the case of elderly, lactating mothers and people with disability, especially as they saw that other INGOs were doing this.
- On the psychosocial interventions, AAI organized a training for trainers for community volunteers in late January. At the community level, two partners started psychosocial interventions, around end-January and early February.
- There were negligible WASH efforts.

### ***Explanatory Factors***

The most important factor to explain the above performance is the fact that the response mechanism needed to go through layers of negotiations, from AAI to partners through to communities, as illustrated in the following diagram. Layers and stages of assessments, contract negotiations and fund remittance issues, as well external factors such as supply/availability of materials, rapid developments on the ground, combined to explain the efficiency of partners response.




Diagram 3: Layers of interactions in emergency response planning and operation

At the AAI level, the internal protocols were set into motion effectively. The AAI decision on 8<sup>th</sup> November 2014 for an emergency response made it possible to a mission team to be in the country within a week, conduct a rapid needs assessment, and come to in-principle agreements with prospective partners. At the same time, fund mobilization efforts were already in motion (DPRF appeal, DEC appeal). IHART and EFAST mechanisms were promptly put into motion.

The prospective partner organisations were asked to submit a needs assessment and proposal. Some organisations initially approached eventually did not submit anything. The processing of partner proposals and contract agreements were done expeditiously so that partner agreements were already in place by the time AAI and prospective partners came together for a “strategic planning workshop” on 17-19 December 2014.

However, technical problems<sup>5</sup> delayed fund remittances that affected some partners’ ability to conduct an earlier relief distribution. (It should be noted that the problem affected even AAI’s own operations to the extent that it had to borrow money from partners to enable it to run its office in Cebu.)

The next level of complexity is at the partners level. All partners have very good track records in long-term community-based development and community organizing. However, none of the partners have any specialist humanitarian competence or significant humanitarian experience. The most advanced is Balay Mindanaw that was involved in two Mindanao emergency response operations in the preceding two years. From that experience, they set up a dedicated humanitarian programme. Most of the others were, at the best, involved in small-scale disaster relief operations. All partners had practically little awareness of SPHERE or other humanitarian standards.<sup>6</sup>

Significantly, all the partners, except for one, were new in the agreed programme areas (or at least did not have direct work in those areas in the past few years). This meant that in practice, the partners spend some time getting information from these areas, including identifying contacts (or reviving old contacts), mobilizing local volunteers, etc.

There was also stiff competition among international donors for local partners. Some organizations initially approached by AAI either did not want additional funding or in the end did not submit any proposal. Some of AAI’s eventual partners were already implementing operations funded by other donors. It is to the credit of AAI that it approached the situation in a constructive manner – i.e., focusing on the potentials of working with other agencies in a synergistic manner. This approach, at least in the case of Caritas work in Cebu and to a certain extent Balay Mindanaw in Leyte, has avoided duplication of efforts that may have contributed to further delays in making resources available to affected communities. In addition, as explained above, this approach has also provided an additional level of confidence for these partners in terms of available resources and expanded reach.

Of course, the partners also needed to live with a number of operating environment issues, fast changing situation at the local level due to the involvement of a large number of actors (government, non-government, multi-lateral, local and international) which were largely

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<sup>5</sup> The delay was mainly due to problems related to the setting up a finance system in a new country. According to AAI, they discussed with partners on the possibility of the latter advancing their own funds to enable an earlier relief operation, in recognition of the urgent need for shelter and women hygiene kits in several villages. WedPro, PFI and BMFI agreed to this suggestion.

<sup>6</sup> Balay Mindanaw participated in a two-day SPHERE orientation seminar organized by another donor in 2012. However, this information did not at all feature in Balay Mindanaw’s planning and operation for the Yolanda response. Another partner received a SPHERE orientation seminar in late February 2014.

uncoordinated, especially in the first six weeks since Yolanda struck. The massive relief efforts also meant that there were shortages in supplies and materials in many places. Operations in January 2014, especially in Samar and Leyte, were also hampered by typhoons *Agaton* and *Basyang*.

Finally, some partners make a point that they needed to look at efficiency vis-à-vis rights-based approach to emergency response, i.e., the fact that they have also invested in building community-based formations, mechanisms and capacities to enable disaster-affected groups to either claim assistance from government and/or work with governance to ensure that relief is delivered to affected communities. Some partners did work with other agencies (e.g., local government, military) to facilitate delivery of relief resources to their areas. However, for the most part, the partner deliveries were mostly done on their own and a substantial part of government deliveries were done even before the partners have started their own operations in the communities.

In conclusion, AAI and its partners, given internal and external considerations, have done their best in making emergency relief resources available to communities at the earliest time that they could. In the future, it would be helpful for the partners to make a sharper analysis and more appropriate decisions and strategies vis-à-vis effective use of resources given that other organisations have already made, in some places, significant amounts of resources available in the communities. In the case of some partners, after an analysis of the situation, their own capacity and other factors, they either decided not to extend emergency relief operations and focus instead on the more long-term work. In the case of other partners, the nature of their support was modified (e.g., from one-off food distribution to extended children's feeding programme, or infrastructure repair).

### 3.2.2. Effectiveness

#### *Observations*

This dimension refers to the actual impact of delivered resources on urgent needs of the affected communities, including an assessment of how recipients valued the resources received. This dimension, alongside the efficiency dimension, also looks at value-for-money considerations.

In the absence of clear internal benchmarks for effectiveness, we proposed to look at comparative benchmarks. Communities identified two desirable features in emergency relief: (a) **significant quantity and variety** (which afforded them peace of mind and security for a longer period) and **orderly distribution** (which spared them the indignity of having to push, shove and shout their way to get relief items from running trucks). This is illustrated in Diagram 4 below.

In terms of the quantity and variety of relief resources: on the one end are those that distributed one-off, small amounts of relief items (e.g., three kg of rice, three pcs of canned goods, and three cups of instant noodles) and, on the other end, people cited an organization that provided in one instance 25 kg of rice, a dozen canned goods and instant



noodles, sugar, coffee, cooking oil and mung beans as well as hygiene kits, household materials and tarpaulin.<sup>7</sup>

In terms of the distribution system, communities expressed admiration for those organizations that sought the help of the community in identifying and prioritizing beneficiaries as well as for suggestions on how best to distribute resources (e.g., tickets or vouchers). Some organizations mobilized local volunteers to assist in the distribution system. Communities had only unkind words for organizations that came unannounced and distributed their relief items in a very disorganized way.



Diagram: Dimensions of effectiveness of emergency relief.

In terms of food and non-food items:

- Most of the partner food packs consisted of between 3 to 10 kg of rice, 3 canned goods and/or 0.5 kg of dried fish, and 5-7 cups of instant noodles. Most of these were one-off distributions. (In one instance, recipients complained of the low quality of rice compared to those given by other organizations.)

<sup>7</sup> A Buddhist foundation from Taiwan, Tso Chi, is cited here as an *outlier*, i.e., considered by many humanitarian actors as a new actor and potentially “game-changer.” Tso Chi distributed not only substantial quantity of relief items but also provided of unconditional cash grants of between PHP 15,000 to 18,000 per household. Criticisms of the Tso Chi operations from humanitarian actors include superficial needs assessment, raising unrealistic expectations and no links to long-term development. However, people who received resources from Tso Chi generally pointed to Tso Chi’s practice as one they would prefer.

- Partners distributed hygiene kits (or dignity kits) consisting mainly of bath soap, toothpaste, sanitary napkins, women’s underwear and some cloth for privacy. In some cases these were stand-alone items and in other cases, these were distributed along with food items. These kits were appreciated in some areas but in others, interviewed beneficiaries preferred to have received food. There were also instances of non-targeted approach so that even male beneficiaries received packs with sanitary napkins and women’s panties.
- In a few cases, beneficiaries reported having received household items such as cooking utensils from partners. Those who received them generally appreciated these.

The distribution of shelter repair kits was high on the agenda of the AAI response programme framework. However, at the time of the RTE, a significant amount of the temporary shelter support/materials was still to be delivered to the communities. The shelter deliveries that were actually undertaken happened between January and February. Shelter repair kits were greatly appreciated by households that received them. There were reports of complaints regarding the manner of distribution, however. In communities we visited, it appeared that the number of beneficiaries selected was based on the original budget agreed. For example, in one community, the budget specified ten units of shelter repair kits for partially-damaged houses. However, the community organization identified 13 households that would have been eligible to receive the shelter repair kits. The organization then agreed to choose the ten beneficiaries by drawing lots. This meant that three households eventually were excluded. One of those who were excluded expressed her sentiments strongly in the focus group discussions.

Three partners implemented cash-for-work initiatives. All of these involved paying individuals a daily amount (according to the daily rate prescribed by government) to help with clearing of debris and construction of temporary shelter. The actual cash distribution was channeled through financial intermediaries (at the suggestion of AAI and also in accordance with the practice of other agencies) mainly for security reasons. This meant that the beneficiaries needed to spend an extra PHP 80.00 in transportation cost to withdraw their money from the municipal center. All the beneficiaries, however, didn’t mind the extra cost. They expressed appreciation for the cash-for-work schemes implemented by both AAI partners and other agencies and regarded these as empowering in the sense that they gain a feeling of dignity and satisfaction in earning their income rather than just relying on relief items.

Finally, all emergency response materials were sourced from local sources based on the partners’ belief that the strategy can help jump-start the local economy.

### ***Explanatory Factors***

The partners have invested in ensuring that adequate community consultations, albeit varying in depth and breadth, were undertaken vis-à-vis needs assessment, beneficiary identification, distribution arrangements, etc. Partner staff mainly did broad site selection. Subsequent decisions were done in consultation with the community – in some cases with the Barangay Council, or community organizations, and in some cases, with both. These consultations were generally recognized and appreciated by communities.

However, the partners also had to deal with the dilemma of balancing the speed of emergency response and the quality and form of resources to be distributed with the need to build local capacities and mechanisms. In some places we visited, the significance and potential issues arising from this dilemma were illustrated by situations where some meeting participants did not know what the community organizations were for, or whether they are actually members or not, and that their main motivation in joining the organization was to get their hands on relief items. In one community, a member of the focus group discussion intimated that in fact she has suspicions that the group being formed has a religious motivation and is against the Catholic Church!

An important aspect of effectiveness is how partners and communities, in a participatory way, deal with changing situations and/or unexpected developments and contending recommendations from community members. The partners had to deal with these issues and make adjustments in a number of aspects of their relief operations. In some areas, partners and communities have made positive adjustments of previous plans and policies (e.g., cash for work mechanisms, more precise targeting of beneficiaries, shifting budget items, revising budgets, distribution mechanisms, etc.).

In some cases, there could be more nuanced approach to changing situations. For example, some partners explained that the basis for their decision of not continuing with food distribution was their observation that there was too much food items being distributed by different organizations.<sup>8</sup> However, a quick discussion with visited communities reveals that, generally, the distributed food items (on aggregate terms) covered one month of their food requirements (or a third of their food requirements since Yolanda struck). The coping strategies for many affected households included subsisting on root crops, support from other family members working in non-affected areas, the income received from cash-for-work schemes, and taking out loans from local stores. In fact, this assessment of the actual food gap could have underpinned a discussion and eventual decision on either scaling up cash-for-work initiatives or accelerating early recovery of vulnerable livelihoods.

On the issue of shelter, some partners are faced with ambiguous policy issues (i.e., no-build zones, land use policy) that impact on their shelter-related activities. It is important that these issues are addressed (see related discussion in a later section). However, there are areas that are not affected by these policy considerations and therefore the partners have more latitude in terms of timeliness and design. It can be argued that the timeliness of temporary shelter might have passed and therefore partners should be talking more about permanent shelter. There are ongoing discussions regarding resilient designs and these could be fast-tracked. In fact, other organizations are ahead in making these decisions and making resources available.<sup>9</sup>

As already indicated previously, the partners generally did not have adequate knowledge or awareness of international humanitarian standards and therefore these did not figure in their emergency relief planning and operations. The partners generally relied on their

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<sup>8</sup> In some cases, partners observed beneficiaries receiving so much food items that the latter were selling or trading most of it for other items. In other cases, some communities appealed to agencies to stop giving them any more canned sardines.

<sup>9</sup> A Filipino billionaire is reported to have started a programme to construct permanent shelter in Leyte at the cost of PHP 200,000 per family and a total cost of PHP 1 billion.

experiences with community development and community organizing, as well as a large dose of common sense, in planning and executing their emergency response.<sup>10</sup> They had to deal with community dynamics and suggestions such as reducing the amount of relief packs to serve more households, or doing a lottery to select recipients of shelter kits even if that meant excluding only one or two households. To their credit, partners expressed willingness to learn along the way, helped by suggestions from AAI staff. For example, one partner realized the need to provide different quantities of relief items to smaller households and bigger ones. Many of them also realized the value of considering specific vulnerable groups, the elderly, lactating women and children, in their operations. As well, they learned from other INGOs operating in proximate areas.

Finally, there is the question of inclusiveness: in the case of some partners, distribution of resources was limited to members of the organization even if there were other people worse off in the community. This extended to situations where male recipients were excluded in the relief distribution organized by a women's organization.

In conclusion, owing to limited understanding of standards as well practical demands in the communities, the effectiveness of the partner emergency response can be pegged to be somewhere in the middle of the two poles identified in the comparative benchmarking discussed in the beginning of this section. The main strength of the partners' emergency work has been their emphasis on community participation and building community capacity to demand for their rights in situations of crises.

### **3.2.3. Accountability**

#### ***Observations***

This dimension includes considerations regarding transparency and accountability<sup>11</sup> especially to recipients of resources, built on ensuring community access to information relevant to the humanitarian response or programme. To a certain extent, it also talks to the degree to which the emergency response adhered to internal and external standards.

We can look at accountability on two dimensions, one, the formal dimension and, two, substantive dimensions. The formal dimension refers to the visible, formal manifestations of transparency, e.g., transparency boards, suggestion boxes and hotlines. AAI has exerted considerable amount of efforts to ensure that partners take the matter of transparency and accountability on board. The partners were expected to make a determination as to which formal mechanisms are practicable, useful and appropriate. It is clear that all partners have come to recognize the value of these mechanisms, albeit these are new to them. However, in the field visits, in only one instance did we see transparency boards, although we were

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<sup>10</sup> Community preferences and decisions are not always straightforward. For example, in some situations, they recommended that food items be divided into smaller packs to benefit a larger number of households. In the curious case of expensive Korean noodles (one unit cost can buy five units of a local brand) and Evian water distributed in one community from another agency, beneficiaries expressed satisfaction over the fact that they had a chance to taste high-quality noodles for once in their lives.

<sup>11</sup> It is important to differentiate accountability and accountancy. The latter contributes to but does not supersede substantive accountability.

assured that in other barangays these are either already being set up or there are plans to do these. There is continuing debate on the level of details, i.e., how much information, especially financial, should be included in these boards.<sup>12</sup>

On the matter of suggestion boxes, we did not see any suggestion box in any of the barangays we visited. However, most partners are of the view that suggestion boxes are less effective compared to setting up hotlines for calls and text messages. People are less incentivized to use suggestion boxes and the limited number of field workers and the distances across barangays means responses to inputs, if any, may be delayed. The partners have provided contact numbers in barangays where they work. At least two partners have reported receiving one text feedback each.

The partners are more comfortable with the substantive dimensions of accountability and transparency, i.e., ensuring community participation and promoting community consultations on important aspects of the response operation. Despite differences in how they understand or operationalize levels of participation/consultation, all partners value being able to provide spaces or opportunities for beneficiaries to air their opinions, views and grievances. In many places, partners have helped either set up new organizations or strengthen existing ones. They have enhanced these community organizations with the formation of new committees such as grievance committees, canvas/procurement committees, oversight committees, etc. It has to be remembered, however, that due to a pervasive culture of “patronage” and feeling of “gratitude”, people who have received resources will find it hard to publicly air their grievances against the sources of these items. In many FGDs we conducted, respondents feel they have neither the space nor the opportunity to express their views. It will take a bit more effort to instill among disaster-affected populations that it is their right to demand assistance from various duty-holders, including government and non-government organizations.

The partners also recognize and appreciate what they understand to be AAI’s preference for lesser visibility and branding at the community level.

Moving to the matter of humanitarian standards and AAI own internal humanitarian principles, it is clear that partner operations were not informed by these standards, e.g., SPHERE, HAP and the Red Cross Code of Conduct. It seems that AAI has focused more on the transparency and accountability issues and less on standards. Given that the partners did not have significant experience in emergency response, especially of this magnitude, it would have been helpful for AAI to provide adequate space and time for the discussion of standards, especially on some of the difficulties and challenges of implementing them in specific situations..<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> While the general trend is towards full disclosure, some partners still argue that providing full financial information can pose some kind of risk to the organization. Another debate is whether to show the full cost of the programme including partner administration and overhead costs or just the net resources that go into the communities. In the place we visited where we saw the transparency board, financial information is posted separately in a separate location.

<sup>13</sup> According to AAI, the December 2013 meeting, HRBA, women’s rights, international standards and transparency and accountability were discussed in different sessions. Handouts on key points of international standards were distributed. The 21-23 February 2014 accountability training was intended to also serve as a follow up to this. The partners reported SPHERE and other standards having been discussed in the December 2013 strategic planning workshop but don’t remember much of what was discussed. Standards were also briefly mentioned but not substantively discussed in the

To conclude, it is important to emphasize that all the partners have a basic commitment to participatory and inclusive, rights-based development; albeit there are differentiations among them on how these are understood and operationalized. The partners are also relatively ahead of most other national humanitarian actors in terms of both formal and substantive dimensions of accountability and transparency. This is something that AAI has contributed significantly – partners appreciate the unrelenting message from AAI that accountability and transparency are part of their humanitarian bottom line.

### **3.2.4. Connectedness**

This dimension has two aspects: one, it refers to the degree to which the partners are engaged or linked with relevant coordination and policy platforms, and two, the extent to which emergency response thinking and action is linked to a more long-term, strategic rehabilitation and reconstruction perspectives and plans.

Partners engagement with or participation in the different coordination and policy platforms (e.g., cluster system) was uneven. Most of them were not even aware of these platforms in the beginning. AAI has encouraged partners to participate in cluster discussions. They also advocated that these clusters should be more inclusive of local actors, rather than just the domain of international NGOs and multilaterals. Those who were able to attend these cluster meetings for the first time readily appreciated the value of engagement with these platforms. However, partners obviously are able to engage more consistently in coordination platforms as well as other relevant formations/movements that are in the same location as their headquarters (e.g., Cebu partners participation in livelihoods and food security cluster meetings and Bangon Visayas activities).

What is stronger and more consistent is the linkage between emergency relief and more long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction perspectives. As early as the December 2014 strategic planning workshop, it was clear that the partners were invested in more long-term development work. It was clear that the emergency phase will end in April 2014 and the rehabilitation phase of at least two years will commence thereafter. In fact, partners were conscious that their work included contributing to the strategic planning workshop organized by AAI in the first week of March 2014. In the case of some partners, the strategy that features a strong emphasis on community organizing and capacity-building illustrates this long-term perspective.

## **3.3. On Partnerships**

AAI has decided to mount a partnership-based humanitarian response programme. It is therefore worthwhile and relevant to devote some time to understand this partnership. On both sides, it was the first time to know, much less to work, each other. The negotiations were done very quickly, mainly on AAI's assessment that the respective organizations shared AAI's beliefs in human-rights approach to humanitarian work, women's rights and

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end-January 2014 inception meeting. The bottom line is that the partners' knowledge on international standards remained at a low level to meaningfully inform operations. Even the knowledge some partners gained on SPHERE from earlier sources did not help.

gender justice, and participatory/inclusive development. It was therefore an incrementally-negotiated relationship as both parties came to know each other gradually in the course of programme implementation.

From AAI's perspective, the strengths of the partners, individually and collectively, include:

- Experience - long experience in development work at the community level, with specific thematic or sector specialization; this mix of experience made interesting discussions on strategies;
- Commitment - to people-based, rights-driven development; all of the partners work within a broader social change agenda rather than just technical, project based engagements;
- Connections – which allowed them to make informed decisions to undertake humanitarian work in new areas; in addition, these connections provided the institutional bases, in terms of networks and relationships, for their post-emergency perspectives and plans;
- Willingness to learn – despite the recognized intensity of requests and demands from AAI during the period, the partners were appreciative of AAI's contribution to their knowledge and skills regarding humanitarian work; they also became more open in expressing their views towards AAI and other partners.


From the partners' side, AAI has demonstrated its commitment to make the partnerships work, providing both funding and non-funding support<sup>14</sup>. At the outset, the partners were appreciative of the speed and flexibility with which AAI managed the needs assessments, partnership engagement, contractual processes and funding. The partners appreciated AAI staff's willingness to provide support and accompaniment to partners, especially in the relatively more technical aspects of humanitarian response. The partners also appreciated AAI's emphasis on linking ground-level work to policy advocacy and the latter's encouragement for partners to attend various cluster meetings. For partners who attended these cluster meetings for the first time, the experience was an eye-opener.

Partners also appreciated the humility, openness and flexibility of AAI staff.

The AAI mission team in the Philippines is structured in the following way. AAI is now in the process of recruiting staff that will eventually constitute the regular country programme structure that will be responsible for the implementation of the post-emergency phases of the programme.

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<sup>14</sup> After the needs assessments, AAI organized a strategic planning workshop with partners on 17-19 December 2013. In early January 2014, a finance training for partners was organized. This was followed by the inception workshop on 29-31 January 2014. The workshop mainly discussed DEC programme requirements, compliance and accountability issues, as well as capacity assessment of partners. On 12-14 February 2014, AAI held a training of trainers session for psychosocial support providers at the community level. More recently, partners attended an accountability training on 21-23 February 2014 and a pilot project on participatory community change planning was undertaken in three municipalities in Cebu in February.



Moving forward, there are a number of partnership issues that need to be addressed as AAI and its partners deepen their development collaboration.

1. **Development approaches.** Moving forward, AAI should continue to facilitate processes of partner discussions and mutual understanding of the three key aspects of development work: (a) different views and operationalization of rights-based approach to development, (b) different perspectives on participatory development, and (c) women’s rights vis-à-vis gender justice and gender mainstreaming, including the need for gender disaggregated data.
2. **Standards and accountability.** AAI can provide more spaces for discussions on humanitarian standards and other protocols. There is also a need for continuing discussions on accountability and appropriate mechanisms for transparency. There is a need to go beyond “compliance” by partners to a more positive embrace of these standards and mechanisms.
3. **Non-funding support.** AAI support to partners, including field visits, trainings, workshops and meetings, and various forms of accompaniment, are well appreciated. However, the partners suggest that these should be planned and spaced better, not only because these eat into operational tasks but also that time is needed for partners to effectively assimilate these learning. It will also be useful for AAI to clarify the respective roles of individual staff and coordinate the agenda of their respective visits.
4. **Information and reporting.** The partners understand AAI’s need for frequent reporting (narrative and financial) within the first phase of the programme. However, in the post-emergency phase, these requirements should be relaxed to be



in line with normal reporting requirements and expectations of other donors. Compliance with these requirements is taxing especially to smaller partners.

5. **Coordination with other donors.** As work moves from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, many organizations are starting to get up to speed on their long-term plans. This is true also of several of AAI partners who have other donors or engagements. It will be helpful for partners to ensure that their various planning engagements with various partners are properly coordinated to ensure synergy, non-duplication and better overall impact.

## 4. Learning and Recommendations

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### 4.1. Lessons from the 2004 Tsunami and 2010 Haiti Response<sup>15</sup>

No two disaster events are the same. However, there are lessons and insights from experiences in significant disaster events that might be helpful to recall or remember as a reference for lessons we are learning in the Yolanda response.

According to the tsunami and Haiti evaluations:

- “The international community needs a fundamental reorientation from supplying aid to supporting and facilitating communities’ own relief and recovery priorities.”
- “All actors should strive to increase their disaster response capacities and to improve the linkages and coherence between themselves and other actors, including those from affected communities themselves.”
- “The quality of initial response was hindered by:
  - A ceaseless flow of often-inexperienced small NGOs and in-kind donations;
  - Limited understanding of context;
  - By-passing local authorities and civil society groups;
  - Insufficient communication with affected populations;
  - Lack of attention to how assistance could better support coping strategies;
  - Weak humanitarian leadership structures”

### 4.2. Lessons and Insights – Yolanda Response

This section summarizes some issues, lessons and insights that emerged in our discussions with communities, partners, AAI staff and among the RTE team.

- **Community participation and inclusive emergency response.** The work of the partners has underscored the importance of community participation in key activities related to emergency response. However, it is important to understand that there are different levels of community participation – from simple consultation to taking the lead in decision-making and other processes that impact on their lives. Community participation also builds on people’s capacities and community resources. A challenge of participation is to open spaces for voices that are traditionally excluded, e.g., women, elderly, people with disability, etc. One realization in the emergency response is the need to make sure that traditional organizational and political boundaries, as well as other forms of exclusion, need to be crossed to ensure that emergency resources get to those who need them most. An extension of meaningful participation is the idea of accountability (and transparency). Access to information is an essential pre-requisite to an informed participation.

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<sup>15</sup> See 2004 Tsunami Coalition Evaluation Report and 2011 ALNAP Haiti-Meta Evaluation.

- **Rights-based approach to humanitarian response.** Many people in the communities we visited said that one of the most important realizations they have is that they have a right to receive quality relief assistance. This is something that the partners have conveyed to communities and this is a message that needs to continue to be communicated to those affected by the disaster. The realization that they should look at emergency relief as a right rather than acts of charity – including claiming these from government and other duty-bearers such as non-government organizations – is not easy given the culture of “gratitude” and “silence” that pervades disaster-affected people in times of crises. The concept and operationalization of rights-based approach to humanitarian response also needs to be a continuing point of discussion among the partners. The issue of *People Surge*, for example, has brought to light differences in partners’ perception of what rights-claiming might look like. Some partners regard People Surge as a high point in disaster-affected people’s exercise of their rights in crisis; other partners look at People Surge as promoting the idea of “victimhood” instead of helping the people to rely on their own resources. Indeed, a rights-based approach to humanitarian response involves addressing pre-existing vulnerabilities and structural causes of poverty.

A critical dimension of rights-based approach to humanitarian and development work is the issue of power and power relations. A helpful approach to understanding power is the idea of levels and spaces of power as elaborated in the power cube framework of John Gaventa and colleagues at the Institute of Development Studies. At the barangay level, it is important to shine a light on nuances of power relations that might be hidden by the degree of familiarity people have with each other as well as the hegemonic nature of patronage politics and patriarchies, for example.

- **Addressing women’s rights and gender issues.** People in communities generally have an appreciation of the importance of addressing women’s needs and are appreciative of efforts by partners to give a more substantive role to women in the humanitarian operations. Among the partners, however, there are differences in understanding of the concept and operationalization of gender issues and women’s rights. Most of the partners have experiences in gender mainstreaming but more needs to be done in terms of sharper and more visible discourse on women’s rights and women leadership as well as the deployment of practical tools such as gender disaggregated data. Some of the existing partners can take the lead in doing this among the partners and in communities.
- **Donor and humanitarian actors coordination.** Finally, the usual problem of coordination among humanitarian actors was very evident. This is an age-old problem that needs to be managed, especially with new/non-traditional actors emerging in significant emergencies. This has to be anchored on building the capacity of local communities and local actors as first responders.

## 4.3. Critical Issues and Recommendations

### 4.3.1. Context

At this point in time, as emergency relief distribution of many humanitarian organizations slows to a trickle, a large number of disaster-affected people are still struggling with food-insecurity, shelter uncertainties and grim prospects for income and livelihoods in the months to come. Emergency shelter and early recovery and vulnerable livelihoods are severely underfunded, according to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).

Looming ahead is the bigger challenge of rehabilitation and reconstruction – with serious deficiencies in terms of ideas, resources and coordination.

UNOCHA has estimated that only 45% of the USD 788 million requested in the Typhoon Haiyan Strategic Response Plan (SRP) has been funded. The abovementioned underfunding of early recovery and vulnerable livelihoods flies in the face of what humanitarian organizations believe to be key to building resilience and sustainability. According to Panfilo Lacson, the Presidential Assistant on Rehabilitation and Recovery, referred to by others as the rehabilitation czar, foreign governments have pledged a total PHP 23 billion worth of assistance but so far only PHP 700 million has been delivered.


Mr. Lacson makes a big thing about corporate private sector involvement in rehabilitation and reconstruction. Ramon Tulfo, a prominent columnist, cites a list of corporate actors listed by Mr. Lacson.<sup>16</sup> Mention has already been made of a billionaire who is donating PHP 1 billion worth of permanent housing in Leyte. Another billionaire, Enrique Razon, owner of the country's biggest casino, is reportedly contributing PHP 250 million to renovate the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center in Tacloban City. Many of these substantial reconstruction investments are independent initiatives and are uncoordinated, much less based on a common rehabilitation framework. It doesn't help that Mr. Lacson himself is dismissive of efforts at evidence-based and coordinated planning.<sup>17</sup>

Not that the government itself is clear on its rehabilitation and reconstruction framework. The government's Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda (RAY) document, supposedly the government's strategic framework and blueprint for rehabilitation and reconstruction, is criticized by many sectors, including some AAI partners, to be ambiguous, long on analysis but short on practical suggestions or new thinking.

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<sup>16</sup> These donors include: Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) and Smart Communications of billionaire Manny Pangilinan; Metropolitan Banking Corp.; Injap Land Corp.; Lopez Group of Companies; Aboitiz Foundation and Ramon Aboitiz Foundation; EEI Corp.; Nickel Asia Corp.; Ayala Corp.; JG Summit Holdings; Ayala Land; Globe Telecom; SM Group of Companies; STI; Asian Terminal Inc.; Phinma; Energy Development Corp.; LT Group; San Miguel Corp., Jollibee

<sup>17</sup> Lacson has announced in February that his agency will go ahead with rehabilitation efforts (referring mainly to schools and public infrastructure) even without the post-disaster assessment by the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council. Lacson's agency also has obvious overlaps in mandate with the SRP (especially in marshalling funds raised) and toward which priorities said resources will be allotted to.



### 4.3.2. Issues and Recommendations

#### *Immediate Concerns*

Given the above external context and the reality that there is no additional funds available from AAI for the emergency response phase, the partners can have two complementary tracks to address existing urgent needs: (a) revisit and/or modify outstanding emergency response phase plans to ensure they are more timely, appropriate and responsive to these needs, (b) scale up their influencing and/or leveraging strategies with relevant organizations to influence the latter’s mode of emergency response investments. They need to focus on two areas: (a) food security and vulnerable livelihoods, and (b) shelter support.

- **Food security and vulnerable livelihoods.** The partners can undertake a rapid food gap assessment exercise to determine food requirements especially in the next three months or so. Armed with this information, partners can deploy various strategies to address the food gap, including: possibilities about cash transfers, or other variations of cash-for-work schemes, influencing allocation decisions of other humanitarian organizations that still have food relief and/or cash transfer resources, etc. The most important option however is for the partners to fast-track the implementation of existing early recovery/livelihoods rehabilitation plans, keeping in mind the impending rainy season and the cropping cycles for agriculture-based livelihoods. Other organizations, including government agencies, are already steps ahead on this.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> For example, see minutes, Livelihood, Commerce and Food Security Cluster Meeting, 14 February 2013

It is also important that fast-tracked livelihoods recovery and rehabilitation plans are coherent with the strategic directions emerging in the partners' initial post-emergency response proposals. A corollary element of this is to continue to ask the government to provide clearer guidance on how to address the long-term requirements of livelihoods of small-scale farmers and fishers. Other organizations are calling attention to issues such cost-sharing between landowners and tenant-farmers, fast-track distribution of equipment and training, fast-track land acquisition and distribution of lands in affected regions as mandated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme and ensuring government agencies have undertaken thorough resource and livelihoods assessments).<sup>19</sup>

- **Shelter support.** The agreed framework among humanitarian actors is “build back better”, i.e., more resilient infrastructure. As already stated earlier, in situations where there are policy issues, partners should work with other organizations to advocate for policies that are pro-poor rather than those that favor the potential of big business interests taking over coastal and other areas cleared of settlement. However, in areas where such policy issues are not relevant, partners can think about shifting their temporary shelter support investment to something more permanent, i.e., along the lines of shelter design discussions among the partners. The partner discussions on possible low-cost, environmentally-sound, culturally-appropriate and disaster-proof housing designs should be fast-tracked and advocated with other shelter support providers (including the government and the corporate sector).

### ***Long-Term Concerns***

As AAI and the partners are starting more focused discussions on the post-emergency response phase of the programme, following are some critical issues that need to be considered not only in the strategic thinking about the rehabilitation and reconstruction programme but also those that relate to what some AAI staff refer to as a long-term legacy for AAI's work in the Philippines.

- **Living with a new “normal”.** Typhoon Yolanda has driven home dramatically the fact that we are faced with a new reality in terms of the nature, magnitude, scale and frequency of disaster events. On the one hand, it has, for example, raised the threshold of people's “sensitivity” to disasters – 40 people dead in the wake of Typhoon Agaton was regarded by the public as “small” and hardly raised any concern outside of areas hit by the typhoon. On the other hand, the imperatives of disaster preparedness, disaster-risk reduction and building adaptation and resilience have become common that everybody now almost speaks the same language – from the disaster-affected communities, to barangay and government officials, to development organizations and the humanitarian community. It is therefore imperative that this awareness is translated into practical terms.

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<sup>19</sup> Oxfam tells govt to help farmers, fishermen in 'Yolanda' areas.  
<http://www.philstar.com/nation/2014/02/17/1291471/oxfam-tells-govt-help-farmers-fishermen-yolanda-areas>

In the majority of our interviews, people did not heed orders or advise to evacuate, referring to their past experiences as a guide, i.e., it couldn't be "that bad." Helping people live and cope with the "new normal" includes helping them understand the complexities and uncertainties that underpin this new reality. The practical challenge is to help people deal with the "trap" of the old and help them be more imaginative and adaptive in approaching this new reality, linking indigenous knowledge with new sources of information. A practical starting point is to ensure that staff and partner understand deeply the concepts of disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and resilience and that these are embedded in long-term development planning.

- **Building new competencies.** As indicated above, one important lesson from the Typhoon Yolanda experience is the imperative of building new competencies for organizations, communities and individuals to deal with novel forms and magnitude of shocks. Disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and building resilience are part of development process, not outside of them. Policy advocacy and influencing initiatives should put these issues at their core.

Community level planning should include preparedness measures, risk reduction and adaptation strategies and policies. There are good examples of municipal level, community-based disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation plans and policies. Disaster preparedness will require building capacity from household to local government level, especially building frontline response donor coordination capacity and donor. Promoting awareness of rights in crisis by people affected by disasters is also important.

At the partner level, all staff should have familiarity with basic humanitarian concepts, standards and modes of working. The case of Typhoon Yolanda has underscored the need to develop an organization's capacity and agility to transform itself into a humanitarian response mode in a moment's notice. All development organizations should have humanitarian competencies. This requires building adaptive management competencies within individual organizations.

Another critical area of organizational competence among the partner is networking – not only among themselves as AAI partners, but also as part of a broader community of national and sub-national development organizations constituting themselves as a network of "world class humanitarians" in thinking and skills. These are organizations who can support frontline or first responders as well as manage international humanitarian actors who might come in for specific disaster events.

One initiative AAI can do is to work with other similar-minded INGOs in the country to bring together their respective partners involved in the Typhoon Yolanda response for a **strategic learning and networking opportunity**. This can take the form of a two or three-day conference or workshop. This is something that can be done immediately as many INGOs and their partner organizations are already buckling down to their post-emergency planning phase.

- **Embracing the challenge of inclusive development.** Participatory development is a powerful concept and it is a significant starting point that both AAI and its partners are strongly committed to promoting this approach. However, as indicated earlier in this document, efforts will need to be undertaken for AAI and partners to have a deeper common understanding of this concept and the range of practical manifestations it can take.

Participatory development is founded on rights-based development perspective, i.e., in addition to their basic rights as human beings (food, livelihoods, security, essential services, voice and identity), poor people have the right to development in terms of demanding these rights from so-called duty-bearers, mainly governments. Rights-based and participatory development is itself founded on an understanding of power. As partners embark on long-term development planning, it will be helpful for them to ensure that they undertake a robust power analysis (at whatever scale of planning they choose to do) that makes visible power relations, especially vis-à-vis excluded members of the community. There are tools available for this.

There are, however, limits to participation and therefore partners should guard against blind populism. Poor people's perspectives and views are important but not the only inputs into planning decisions. For instance, a simple summary of what poor people consider more important support they would like to receive will result in a very long and multi-dimensional shopping list that will be impossible for one organization to address.<sup>20</sup>

- **Post-Emergency response perspectives.** The last point about the huge range of needs expressed by communities drive home the point that post-emergency response activities should start from understanding the pre-existing level, nature and drivers of poverty and vulnerability.

By the time this report is drafted, the partners and AAI have already started developing their proposals for the post-emergency planning. Moving forward, it might help to take the following into consideration:

- **Level of analysis and planning.** AAI and partners should explore the possibility of pegging their planning at the municipal level. Doing so will address policy dimensions and political decisions, especially those relating to disaster-risk reduction at adaptation, that are located at the municipal level. AAI and partners can link their barangay level community change planning initiative with other agencies' efforts towards participatory planning at the municipal level.


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<sup>20</sup> For example, communities identified priority/urgent needs include: relief response to continue until they are able to support themselves, building disaster-resilient permanent housing, household needs such as folding beds, kitchenware, etc., building disaster-proof evacuation centers, disaster alert system, disaster response equipment, financial support for livelihoods and income-generating activities (irrigation, local factories, provision of seedlings, fertilizers, fishing gear, pedicabs, bakeshops, farming tools, recycling shops, communal gardens), reconstruction of barangay infrastructure (barangay hall, concreting of roads, classrooms, water system), subsidy for children's education, health services, stress debriefing, medicines, medical equipment.



This is also linked with the matter of ensuring a more focused/concentrated geographic strategy instead of the geographic spread in the emergency response phase.

- **Coherent development framework.** Linking with other post-emergency planning efforts will not only avoid duplication and confusion but also provide a practical development framework within which individual initiatives can be understood. In the face of uncertainty and unclarity in the government overall Yolanda reconstruction plan, this can provide a certain level of coherence. This can also provide a common agenda for advocacy among civil society organizations.
- **Participatory governance, planning and budgeting.** Post-emergency plans needs to be linked to efforts of promoting participatory governance, planning and budgeting, making these mechanisms responsive to poor people's right to development.
- **Priority to poor people in allocation of post-emergency resources.** It is a truism that private business interests usually profit more from disaster situations than poor people. It is therefore imperative that AAI and partners continue to advocate that scarce resources are made available to poor people rather than being cornered by private business interests. For example, a number of private resort owners in Bantayan Island are availing of millions of pesos in government loans at concessionary interest rates to help them rehabilitate their businesses.



## **THE UNIQUE AAI APPROACH**

**MULTI-DIMENSIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE**

**LINK TO LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE**

**TAKING THE SIDE OF THE POOR AND THE EXCLUDED**

**FOCUSING ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS**

**ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEOPLE LIVING IN POVERTY**

**HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH/PRINCIPLES**

**STRENGTHENING LOCAL CAPACITY OF PARTNERS**

**SHARING AND BUILDING ON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCES**

# Annexes

## 1. RTE Timeline

DATE	ACTIVITIES
12-15 February	Contracting, finalization of RTE design Research team workshop
17 - 24 February	First batch – field work Secondary data analysis
25 February – 2 March	Second batch – field work Partner head office interviews AAI interviews
2 - 3 March	Preliminary report writing
4 March	Presentation of preliminary findings – AAI and partners workshop
5 – 12 March	Feedback, additional information Submission of final report

## 2. List of Informants

Barangay Informants	
Bgy Tabgas, Leyte	7 FGD participants 7 individual informants
Bgy Liloan, Ormoc, Leyte	5 FGD participants 7 individual informants
Bgy Manaybanay, Leyte	7 FGD participants 7 individual informants
Bgy Flores, Antique	8 FGD participants 8 individual informants
Bgy Toginhao, Antique	8 FGD participants 7 individual informants
Bgy Burak, Salcedo, E Samar	8 FGD participants 7 individual informants
Bgy Palaypay, Basey	10 FGD participants 6 individual informants
Bgy Panugmonon, Basey	8 FGD participants 8 individual informants
Bgy Aguho Daanbantayan	45 FGD participants 7 individual informants
Bgy Tominjao, Daanbantayan	20 FGD participants 8 individual informants
Partner Informants	
Caritas Switzerland	Yvonne Affolter, Director
FARDEC	Patrick, Executive Director
Pagtambayayong	About 12 staff of Pagtambayayong, Lihok and Phildhrra
PKKK	Cynthia Esquillo, Coordinator

RMP	Sr. Francis Anover
WedPro	Aida Santos, plus two other staff
Balay Mindanaw	4 staff and board members, including Aileen Ipulán
<b>AAI Staff</b>	
Amar Nayak	Head of Mission
Rosie Oglesby	Accountability Adviser
Catherine	Capacity Building Adviser
Philemon	Policy Adviser
Khaing	Programme Officer
<b>Others</b>	
CDP	Malu Cagay
CCCI	Mary Grace Narca
Consultant on Community Planning	Adil

### 3. Some Stories

#### Virgilio Villamor, 63 years old Bgy. Liloan, Ormoc City

Virgilio is a farmer with three children who are all married. He lives with two grandchildren. He needs to continue to work to support them. His wife who is 62 years old helps in the farm and also takes care of the grandchildren. They have a small farm planted to corn, rice and vegetables which supported them as they are able to harvest every quarter and therefore provide them with some income.

Yolanda was a nightmare for them – they lost everything, their house, their crops, their livestock. In the days immediately following the typhoon, they starved and suffered and almost lost all hope that they will survive. During the typhoon, they opted to stay in their house, made of wood and *nipa*, for fear that people might steal their resources. They did not heed the order to evacuate. They were surprised by the strength and ferocity of the typhoon and in just a few hours, their house and everything else were blown away. They moved to a neighbour’s house but the roof was also blown away. They survived but they had nothing to eat for a number of days.

They were thankful for the coming of humanitarian actors and the relief goods provided enabled them to survive. In particular, his wife was particularly happy to receive the dignity kit from PPKK, especially the underwear that came with it. As an old woman, she felt that she was always left out and her needs were not always addressed. With the dignity kit, she really felt “dignified”.

#### Annabella Son, Community Volunteer Bgy. Aguho, Daanbantayan

She met Pagtambayayong for the first time on 16<sup>th</sup> December. The Barangay Captain asked if she wanted to become a community volunteer. This suggestion was seconded by other members of the community. At the time, she didn’t have any idea what the position entailed. It was only during the first meeting of community volunteers after Christmas that she understood what it meant to be a community volunteer. She agreed to remain a community volunteer because she wanted to help the community.

As a community volunteer, she meets with the Community Organizer (Pagtambayayong staff) almost three times a week. Her responsibilities include community visits and meetings, share learnings from seminars she attended, and follow-up/monitor projects. She facilitated the meeting where the shelter kit beneficiaries were chosen. She was so busy in the past weeks with a lot of meeting. She is not eligible to receive emergency relief but she receives a meal allowance of PHP 250.00 per meeting. Of the 194 households in the barangay, they have now 80 members. She is not sure whether this is one member per household, or if more than one member of the household can be a member.

**Melinda, 47 years old**  
**Bgy. Manaybanay, Pastrana, Leyte**

Melinda is 47 years old, widow and a mother of 10 children. Three of her children are already married while the rest, in the elementary and high school, stills lives with her and fully dependent on her. She managed to support her big brood by doing all sorts of work such as doing laundry, farm worker, selling snacks, in addition to doing household chores. Every day was a challenge but she managed to survive.

Typhoon Yolanda has wiped out all her resources – not only her house but also her opportunities to earn a living as her neighbors and former employers could not afford to pay her anymore. She did not have a single centavo left when Yolanda struck.

The experience of the typhoon left the family in a trauma. The families stayed in their small house despite the barangay leaders' advise for them to evacuate. Their house soon collapsed and they ran to the barangay health center. The sight of their house collapsing caused her children to panic. Inside the barangay health center, they continued to be buffeted by strong winds and rain. This led to Melinda's son running out of the center in the middle of the typhoon for fear that it too will collapse. Unfortunately, her son was hit by flying debris and lumbers that caused his death. Her son was buried the next day without coffin.

Her losses devastated Melinda. However, she kept remembering that she had nine other children to support. Despite the feeling of utter hopelessness and the fact that she doesn't have any resource to buy even their basic needs, Melinda continues to look out for possibilities and opportunities. At present, the family is still living in their neighbor's house as they have no money to rebuild their house.

Melinda is one of the recipients of ActionAid resources through the Rural Missionaries of the Philippine. She was able to receive relief goods. At the time of the RTE, RMP launched a cash-for-work programme and Melinda was chosen as one of the beneficiaries. While she still has outstanding needs such as rebuilding her house and resuming her income-generating activities, Melinda feels a bit of relief from the resources she received and grateful that she was chosen as one of beneficiaries.

**Elma Paral, Bgy Councilor**  
**Bgy. Aguho, Daanbantayan**

Elma is currently a Councilor of the barangay and also a community volunteer for the Pagtambayayong programme as suggested by the Barangay Captain. She used to work as Barangay Health Worker but she was terminated, apparently without cause along with nine other Barangay Health Workers, when the new Daanbantayan Municipal Mayor assumed his post in 2013. They were replaced by new appointees of the Mayor. She worked for 10 years as Barangay Health Worker and received nothing when she was terminated. At present, she relies on her salary of PHP 5,000 as Barangay Council member. Her husband started to till a small plot of land borrowed from her father. She has two sons aged 21 and 18. Recently, her younger son's girlfriend moved in with them.

Before Typhoon Yolanda struck, the Barangay Captain mobilized the Barangay Health Workers and the Barangay Tanod (Guards) to advise people to evacuate. However, a number of people choose to remain in their houses. During the typhoon itself, Barangay Tanods had to forcibly evacuate some people. The school buildings were designated as evacuation areas. However, these were also damaged by the typhoon so that people had to move to a concrete house. Elma's newly-constructed house was totally damaged. Her family is now living in her grandfather's dilapidated and abandoned house. From her own money, she bought three meters of tarpaulin to serve as roof.

Elma first met Pagtambayayong staff just before Christmas 2013. In that meeting, she was asked by the Barangay Captain to be a community volunteer. However, she soon found out that as a community volunteer, she could not be eligible to receive any benefit from Pagtambayayong. She felt disappointed but continued to serve as community volunteer because she wants to help the community. She hopes that her son can work somehow on shelter rehabilitation where he expects to earn PHP 300.00 per day.

**Mary Joyce Booc, 20 years old  
Bgy. Tominjao, Daanbantayan**

Mary Joyce stopped schooling after finishing 3<sup>rd</sup> year high school, when her father died. She worked as a househelp with an aunt for a year and then came back to Bgy Tominjao where she met the father of her future children. They decided to live together in an empty nipa hut since 2010. They now have a three-year old child and she is six months on the family way. Her partner works with his father in a small-time logging operation.

Before Yolanda struck, they heard the advise from the Barangay to evacuate. However, they decided to stay put because her in-laws kept telling them that they should put their trust in God. They also thought that even the designated evacuation centres were flimsy and also put people at risk. She remembers being very scared when the typhoon came. Compared to Typhoon Frank that hit them three years ago, Yolanda felt very different – she felt the ground moving and trembling.

They are now living in her parents-in-laws' house, that was also damaged but they managed to repair it somehow. There are now six people in a rather small house. They had PHP 500 with which they wanted to buy rice, only to find out that rice in all stores were also wet. But they were able to buy other stuff in the stores. They first heard of relief distribution after one week. There was no announcement. They just heard people talking about it and rushing to the barangay centre. So they followed the crowd. There was a lot of shoving and pushing as everybody was hungry. In the end, all they got was a kilogram of rice, a can of sardines and a few packs of instant noodles. She feels that their barangay have received so little whereas other barangays, especially those nearer the highway, received too much.

She didn't get anything special for her young child, nor hear anybody asking about her pregnant condition. She heard of Oxfam that gave her unconditional cash due to her condition. Altogether, she received PHP 4,800 that mostly went to buying rice, cooking utensils and baby clothes. She appreciated the hygiene kit that came with the Caritas Austria pack. This included soap, feminine napkins, and toothpaste. FARDEC, AAI partner in the area, did not distribute any food and non-food items also Joyce remembers chocolates and biscuits being distributed.

FARDEC is new to her. This is the second meeting that she attended. She has not participated in other activities yet. She did not participate in the psychosocial activity and does not know of anybody who participated either, although she is interested in participating if another one is organized. She is expecting to receive shelter assistance from FARDEC.

## 4. RTE Design

### 4.1. BACKGROUND

This exercise is the real-time evaluation of the ActionAid International Yolanda Humanitarian Response programme. The programme started with the deployment of a country mission team in the country one week after typhoon Haiyan struck. The mission team later grew to become a 16-person team.

The AAI Yolanda Humanitarian Response programme is based on the Operational Programme Framework and is being implemented through seven NGO partners in six provinces, including Eastern Samar, Western Samar, Leyte, Cebu, Antique and Iloilo.<sup>21</sup> AAI has a total of about USD 5 million for this programme.

According to the AAI Typhoon Yolanda Emergency Response Phase Programme Framework (November 2013-April 2014), AAI will implement a humanitarian response consistent with its humanitarian principles and protocols and will include the following components:

- Immediate food and non-food support
- Livelihood support
- Psychosocial interventions
- Shelter support
- Water sanitation and hygiene
- Protection and safe spaces for women and girls
- Information sharing

The three-month relief period is nearing its end and ActionAid is looking towards developing a three-year programme thereafter. Towards this end, ActionAid has already asked its partners to commence community level planning.

### 4.2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to assess whether ActionAid's initial response to-date has served the intended purpose agreed in the Emergency Response Framework while considering key variables of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, value for money and connectedness. It should also map the aspects of the response (internal and external to ActionAid International Philippines) that went well and which areas require improvement based on major programmatic, funding and organisational learning.

The primary stakeholders of the evaluation are AAIP staff responsible for implementing and managing the programme.

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<sup>21</sup> The programme is fully partnership-based. None of the partners has a core competency in humanitarian response. ActionAid itself has not worked in the Philippines prior to this response.

### **4.3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION<sup>22</sup>**

#### ***Programme Implementation***

- To examine the outcomes of the response in meeting immediate needs of communities affected by Typhoon Yolanda, with a particular focus on women, against set programme objectives
- To examine the effectiveness of AAIP operations and initiatives under the response programme, including consideration of cost-effectiveness, value for money, speed, quality and community satisfaction.
- To investigate the extent to which AAI principles and approaches have been operationalized in the response.
- To identify and document successes and good practice case studies during the implementation as well as examine the extent to which past lessons or recommendations have been fulfilled.

#### ***Organisational Response***

- To examine and review the speed of the response locally, nationally and internationally by ActionAid including coordination and support provided by IHART, the AAI Accountability Group and relevant AAI stakeholders such as fundraising, communications and finance.
- To examine the extent to which the project management arrangements have been effective and how funding opportunities were managed by AAIP to expand its response programme. Look at donor compliance and whether these were observed throughout the response.
- To understand AAIP's approach of working in partnerships with local partners (capacities, commitments, pace of response, etc.) and assess the effectiveness of this response.

#### ***Overall***

- To understand the critical challenges that AAIP faced during the initial response phase and the extent to which they were effectively managed.
- To identify and make recommendations on those areas that require improvement.
- To make recommendations both for AAIP and AAI more broadly on aspects for replication, termination, modification in the interventions to enrich the ongoing recovery and rehabilitation phase as well as for future emergency response interventions

### **4.4. FRAMEWORK OF EVALUATION**

Real time evaluations are usually understood as evaluations “in which the primary objective is to provide feedback in a participatory way in real time to those executing and managing the humanitarian response.” It normally includes the key dimensions of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, connectedness and coordination. In this present inquiry, the exercise is being undertaken towards the end of the emergency response phase and is expected to feed more into the next phase of the programme, i.e., medium-to-long term rehabilitation and reconstruction.

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<sup>22</sup> From the original Terms of Reference



## **Overall intent**

The evaluation is meant to assess the extent to which AAI has achieved the objectives of its Typhoon Yolanda humanitarian response programme.

### **4.4.1. Main methodological approach**

The evaluation will be largely participatory, cognizant of the facts that (a) this is a partnership-based programme and therefore AAI's performance is pegged or linked closely with its partners' performance and (b) there will be limitations in the degree of actual participation in the exercise by some stakeholders due to time and other constraints.

An essential element of a participatory approach is to involve key stakeholders not only as information sources but also as participants in the analysis of trends and identifying lessons from the response. Community informants will have this chance in the community-feedback activity at the end of each community research in individual villages, the partners during their respective interviews and AAI staff during the preliminary presentation session that is also expected to provide spaces for AAI staff for joint reflection, analysis and learning.

### **4.4.2. Main dimensions**

The evaluation will primarily investigate the response experience through four (4) key dimensions of: (a) efficiency, including timeliness, (b) effectiveness, including relevance and recipient satisfaction, as well as value for money vis-à-vis efficiency, as well as inclusivity, (c) accountability, primarily on how the response allowed for local voices and rights-claiming, and role for local institutions and organisations and (d) connectedness, which will include both AAI coordination/relationship with other actors, policy dimensions, as well as strategic perspectives embedded in the emergency response. An important component across all these dimensions is gender – primarily around addressing women's rights, strengthening women's voices and their organisations.

The study will also put premium to both an appreciative approach balanced with good enough triangulation. It is essential that the study also emerge unexpected resulted or unintended consequences.

Observations about these dimensions will be interrogated along a number of explanatory or contributory factors that will include, among others, institutional mechanisms and partnerships, community dynamics and political context, broader policy context and humanitarian actors dynamics and relationships.

### **4.4.3. Research Questions**

#### ***On efficiency***

How quickly did AAIP and partners mount needs and assessment and agree on the operating framework?

How quickly did AAIP and partner humanitarian resources reached the intended recipients?  
What mechanisms were used to facilitate the delivery of resources? How did the humanitarian response build on and strengthen local organisations and institutions?  
How much did preparedness contribute to the efficiency of the delivery of resources?  
How did AAI/AAIP manage resource mobilization, generation and leveraging?

### ***On effectiveness***

To what extent were the purposes of humanitarian response achieved?  
How relevant and/or appropriate were the resources provided given the needs of the community? What role did the community have in the determination of resources to be made available?  
Were the services and resources delivered of a quality consistent with internal standards or expectations of AAIP?  
How were the resources sourced? Did the sourcing contribute to strengthening or supporting local economic institutions or entities?  
What is the level of satisfaction by the community vis-à-vis the services rendered and resources delivered by partners?  
Would the community preferred to receive resources other than or in lieu of the resources provided?  
Did the response address specific needs of women?  
To what extent did the response included special groups such as the elderly, children, and people with disabilities?

### ***On accountability***

What mechanisms were put in place to ensure that recipient's complaints, views and suggestions were raised and acted upon?  
What measures were taken to ensure that partners, local organisations and institutions and recipients will have access to relevant information vis-à-vis the programme?  
What evidence are there to show that women's rights were taken into account and promoted in the course of the programme, from concept to implementation?  
What spaces were provided to ensure that the programme covered the normally-excluded groups within the community?

### ***Connectedness***

How did AAIP and partners coordinate and collaborate with other local actors?  
What emerged as the specific value-added or role of either AAIP or partners in the humanitarian response community?  
To what extent did emergency response decisions and forms included strategic considerations for post-emergency medium-to-long term work?

### ***Other Areas of Inquiry***

- The appropriateness and efficacy of the AAIP partnership approach
- Rights in emergencies and people's wellbeing
- Unintended positive results, surprises
- Significant learning
- Where AAIP and/or partners made the most difference

#### 4.4.4 Methodologies

The evaluation will employ the following specific methodologies:

- ***Analysis of secondary data***
  - Relevant data from both AAIP and AAI
  - Relevant partner data
  - Other sources
  
- ***Interviews***
  - Key informant interviews
    - Community level
      - Individual recipients
      - Volunteers
      - Government and other local actors
    - Partner level
      - Head office staff
      - Local/field staff
    - AAIP staff
    - Other expert and relevant sources
      - UN and government
      - Peer organisations
  - Focus Group Discussion
    - Community level
      - Women's only group
      - Mixed group
  
- ***Case stories***
  - A number of case stories will be written up to highlight critical issues and learning
  
- ***Feedback and reflection***
  - Instant feedback at community level
  - Preliminary presentation and discussion at AAIP level

#### 4.4.5. Sample/Site Selection

Given the limited time, the evaluation will select 2-3 barangays from each province (preferably adjacent and recommended by partners), especially those where there is an intersection of more than one partner operating.

More specifically, the study will be conducted in the following areas:

- Leyte
  - Ormoc City, Barangay Lilo-an with Balay Mindandao and PKKK
  - Albueria, Barangay Tabgas with Balay Mindanao
  - Pastrana, Barangay Dulag with Rural Missionaries

- Samar
  - Easter Samar, Salcedo, Barangay Jagnaya with PKKK
  - Wester Samar, Basey, Barangay Poblacion with PKKK and Barangay Panugmonon with Rural Missionaries
- Antique or Panay
  - Two barangays recommended by WedPro (to be confirmed and may be dropped)
- Northern Cebu – Daanbantayan
  - Two barangays recommended by two Cebu-based partners (FARDEC and Pagtambayayong)

#### **4.4.6. Key Documents**

Documents that will be examined in this inquiry will include the following:

- Assessments
  - AAI Response Team Assessment
  - Partner Rapid Appraisals
  - AAI Follow-up Assessment
- Operational Documents
  - Emergency Response Framework/Concept Note
  - Partner Proposals
  - Operational/Update Reports – AAIP and Partners
  - Fundraising Framework and Reports
  - Other local documents
- Relevant Secondary Sources

#### **4.4.7. Assessment Criteria**

The assessment will rely mainly on relative benchmarking (vis-à-vis other comparator humanitarian actors) as well as recipients' self-public satisfaction on resources received. The assessment will also refer to, as appropriate, the AAI humanitarian principles:

- Three core outcomes
  - Women and women's institutions sufficiently empowered
  - Communities, partners and local institutions have the skills, knowledge, systems and resources for emergency preparedness, response and recovery
  - Humanitarian system at local, national and international level is more accountable and better-coordinated
- Principles
  - Putting the active agency of people living in poverty first – and building their awareness of rights
  - Analyzing and confronting unequal power
  - Advancing women's rights
  - Building partnerships
  - Being accountable and transparent
  - Monitoring, evaluating and evidencing impact
  - Linking work across levels to address structural change
  - Being solutions-orientated and promoting credible and sustainable alternatives

#### **4.4.8. Recommendations**

Appropriate recommendations will be developed along the four key dimensions and the areas of (a) various phases of humanitarian responses, (b) delivery systems and partnership approaches, and (c) policy advocacy. As appropriate, specific recommendations will be addressed to different actors.stakeholders, i.e., AAI, AAIP, partners.